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ABSTRACT. Although the broad concept of mental models is gaining currency as a way to explore the link between how people
think and interact with their world, this concept is limited by a theoretical and practical understanding of how it can be applied
in the study of human-environment relationships. Tools and processes are needed to be able to elicit and analyze mental models.
Because mental models are not directly observable, it is also important to understand how the application of any tools and
processes affects what is measured. Equally important are the needs to be clear on the intent of the elicitation and to design the
methods and choose the settings accordingly. Through this special edition, we explore how mental models are elicited using
two approaches applied in two case-study regions. We analyze two approaches used in the Crocodile River catchment of South
Africa: a graphically based approach, i.e., actors, resources, dynamics, and interactions (ARDI); and an interview- or text-based
approach, i.e., consensus analysis (CA). A further experiment in the Rhone Delta (Camargue), France, enabled us to test a cross-
over between these two methods using ARDI methodology to collect data and CA to analyse it. Here, we compare and explore
the limitations and challenges in applying these two methods in context and conclude that they have much to offer when used
singly or in combination. We first develop a conceptual framework as a synthesis of key social and cognitive psychology
literature. We then use this framework to guide the enquiry into the key lessons emerging from the comparative application of
these approaches to eliciting mental models in the two case regions. We identify key gaps in our knowledge and suggest important
research questions that remain to be addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of a mental model, an internal representation of
external reality (Jones et al. 2011), has become part of the
common lexicon of many scientists, business practitioners,
and laypeople. The widespread use of the concept, however,
masks notable differences in the meanings associated with it
in terms of what mental models are, where they reside, and
what people do with them (Jones et al. 2011). Some of the key
differences in meanings associated with the concept of mental
models include questions such as whether mental models
reflect pre-existing, stable knowledge structures (Abel et al.
1998) or situation-specific and hence ephemeral knowledge
structures (Greeno 1989, Smith and Semin 2004); whether
mental models are narrative or image based (Kosslyn 1985,
Macinnis and Price 1987, Moulton and Kosslyn 2009); the
extent to which they are predominantly individual or collective
knowledge structures (Mohammed et al. 2000, Mohammed
and Dumville 2001, Ritchie-Dunham and Puente 2008); and
whether mental models are embodied knowledge structures
rather than being purely cognitive “in the head” knowledge
structures (Barsalou 2009). Clusters of literature have
developed around particular fields of enquiry and expertise,
with varying degrees of conceptual and methodological
overlap among them, e.g., research on team mental models
and team performance (Converse et al. 1991, Mathieu et al.
2005, Smith-Jentsch et al. 2008), the roles of mental models
in human reasoning (Johnson-Laird 2001, Byrne 2002,
Johnson-Laird and Goldvarg-Steingold 2007, Byrne and
Johnson-Laird 2009, Johnson-Laird 2010), and the large body
of research on mental models in business and organizational
environments (Senge 1990, 1992, Davison and Blackman
2005). 
Despite the apparent importance of the mental model construct
for understanding human-environment interactions, when our
research for this special feature was initiated in 2006, there
had not been a great deal of work in this field (Jones et al.
2011). As noted, the literature on the elicitation and analysis
of mental models in other contexts or fields was extensive and
incorporated a notable diversity of meanings, interpretations,
and methods. What was lacking was a clear synthesis of theory
and methods that was oriented toward mental models in
human-environment interactions. A working group was
established within an international research consortium called
the Resilience Alliance (http://www.resalliance.org/), of wh-
ich one purpose was to contribute to filling this gap through a
practical application of methods and a review of aspects of the
theory and methods associated with eliciting mental models.
The results of this intent are reflected in the papers of this
special feature. In this final paper of the special feature, we
synthesize the key learning that emerged through the
application of two mental model elicitation techniques in the
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Crocodile River catchment, South Africa: a graphically based
approach, referred to as ARDI (actors, resources, dynamics,
and interactions; Etienne et al. 2011, Mathevet et al. 2011);
and a verbal or text-based approach called consensus analysis
(CA; Stone-Jovicich et al. 2011). In addition to this structured
comparison, an allied research activity in France enabled us
to test a cross-over between these two methods using the ARDI
methodology to collect data and then CA to analyze them
(Mathevet et al. 2011). 
In seeking to synthesize the results of the papers in this special
feature, we are faced with the daunting task of making sense
of the diversity in meanings and interpretations associated with
the concept of mental models. We wanted to know which
definition or body of theory we should use and which was
most suitable for our purpose of examining the two elicitation
approaches that were used. The review by Jones et al. (2011)
provides considerable guidance in relation to important
conceptualizations of mental models, some of the associated
concepts such as schema theory and how they might relate to
mental models, and guidance on some of the methods used to
elicit and analyze mental models. Here, we seek to add to the
synthesis of Jones et al. (2011) by outlining why there is such
a diversity of meanings associated with the mental models
concept and what this diversity may reflect. We do this using
social representations theory (Moscovici 1988, Wagner and
Hayes 2005). In addition, we present a conceptual model to
guide discussion of mental models and to aid interpretation of
the papers in this special feature. In developing this synthesis,
we have drawn on current cognitive and social psychology
theory to develop a conceptualization of mental models that
we then use as an aid to explore similarities and differences
across the elicitation and analytical methods used. We
conclude with a discussion of the implications of this working
group’s findings for future research and identify important
gaps in the current understanding of mental models in human-
environment interactions.
A MENTAL MODEL CONCEPTUALIZATION
Mental models as social representations
In their explanation of the differences between social cognition
(the processes through which people seek to understand
themselves and others) and social representation theories,
Wagner and Hayes (2005:122) note, “It is the meaning of the
things in, and for, the lives of people which makes them a
social object.” In this sense, the concept of a mental model is
a social representation: a social object that has gone through
“a historical social process of elaboration, communication and
dissemination of knowledge systems” (Wagner and Hayes
2005:322). The mental model concept has become a widely
accepted social object in the lives and communication of
everyday people, e.g., reflected in creative writing since the
mid- to late 1800s, as well as an important concept across a
diversity of academic disciplinary writing and theorizing
(Jones et al. 2011). It should come as no surprise therefore that
the concept of a mental model “forms a structured, multi-
dimensional portrayal of the subject area—that is, a whole set
of statements related to one another as a theory-like construct...
As such, a social representation is not a portrayal in the sense
of a proposition which can be either true or false” (Wagner
and Hayes 2005:121). Given this notion of a structured, multi-
dimensional portrayal and the fact that we currently cannot
observe mental models, we should expect, as Jones et al.
(2011) identify in their review of the literature, that different
individuals and academic disciplines stress different
dimensions or sets of statements when using the mental models
construct. We suggest that the cognitive dimensions of social-
ecological systems are a key, and yet little-discussed,
component of these complex systems. 
Structuralist theories of social representations (Abric 2001,
Wagner and Hayes 2005) identify core and peripheral
dimensions of representations. Core elements of a social
representation are consensual and relatively stable, whereas
the peripheral elements are the more individualized and
dynamic components of the social representation. This
distinction is useful in helping to make sense of the multi-
dimensional subject area, which has come to be associated
with the concept of mental models. Through our explorations
of the literature, we identified three shared or core dimensions
of the mental models concept. The first comprises relatively
long-term and stable knowledge structures, often referred to
as schema (Taylor and Crocker 1981, Jones et al. 2011). A
second dimension relates to the situation in which the
individual or group finds itself. The situation provides cues or
stimuli that mediate cognition (Novak and Hoffman 2009); it
also provides affordances (Gibson 1986, Greeno 1994) that
extend the cognitive abilities of an individual in a given
situation (Smith and Semin 2004, Yeh and Barsalou 2006).
The third core dimension of the mental models concept relates
to the attributes of the individual. Concepts such as an
individual’s need for cognition or a person’s cognitive style
are examples of elements of this third dimension (Cacioppo
and Petty 1982, Childers et al. 1985, Stanovich and West 1998,
Stanovich 1999).
A conceptual framework
As an aid to further discussion and reflection on what we have
learned in relation to mental models, we developed a schematic
representation of these core dimensions of the mental models
concept and their possible relationships to one another (Fig.
1). We briefly justify the illustrated components and
relationships through reference to key findings in the literature
and then go on to use this simplified representation as a
framework with which to discuss the contributions of the
papers in this special feature. Each of these core dimensions
is likely to contribute to observed variation and hence
uncertainty in elicited mental models when looked at
individually or across social groups. We therefore use the
Ecology and Society 17(3): 23
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art23/
conceptualization (Fig. 1) to explore factors likely to
contribute to uncertainty in elicited mental models in the
context of human-environment interactions.
Fig. 1. Conceptual representation of the core dimensions of
the mental models concept and their interrelationships. To
simplify as much as possible, feedbacks such as those
between mental models and knowledge structures are not
shown.
At a relatively coarse level of description, the
conceptualization of mental models (Fig. 1) starts with the
expectation frame, which can be thought of as a socially
defined structure of “tacit theories about what exists, what
happens, and what matters” in a given situation (Gitlin 1980).
It thus prepares an individual for what to expect in a given
situation, and hence cues what moods, motivations, and
expectations with which an individual enters a situation. For
example, whether a situation is framed as an academic enquiry
or a management-oriented decision enquiry is likely to orient
the individual toward particular moods, motivations, and
expectations. These moods, motivations, and expectations are
amenable to modification through the unfolding of the
situation, but we argue that it is the individual’s prior
experience and framing that orients the individual toward
particular cognitive states in relation to the given situation. 
When an individual needs to perform some action (whether
physical or cognitive) in a given situation, he/she draws on
associative or rule-based knowledge structures as well as cues
from the environment, e.g., available images, text, or natural
objects, to compile a situation-specific mental model. The
individual’s cognitive orientations, motivations, and cognitive
capacity mediate the translation and merger of knowledge
from his/her knowledge structures with information from the
situation to yield mental models that are suited to what the
individual needs to do in the situation (Fig. 1). Thus, for
example, in an environmental situation in which an individual
who cared a great deal about the Crocodile River catchment
was unhappy with how it was changing, had few other
demands on his/her time, and was asked in a research situation
to explain what caused problems with the river’s flow, the
individual might rely on his/her rule-based processing system
to develop a mental model of the causes of problems with river
flow. In a different situation, another individual who had been
working within Crocodile River catchment management
agencies for several decades and, while under great time
pressure, was asked (by academics he/she considered
irrelevant to the condition of the catchment) about
stakeholders in the catchment, might answer rapidly, thus
drawing on his/her associative knowledge systems. 
The degree to which an individual’s mental model draws on
the knowledge from the associative or rule-based systems is
contingent on the situation, the motivation of the individual
to engage in thoughtful processing, and the cognitive capacity
of the individual at that time (Smith and DeCoster 2000). When
individuals are not motivated to think deeply about an issue,
they tend to rely on the associative mode of thinking. Affect
or situational expectations play an important role in weighting
the likelihood of associative or rule-based modes of
processing. Positive affect is likely to result in associative
processing, whereas negative affect is more likely to result in
use of the rule-based processing mode (Smith and DeCoster
2000, Kahneman 2011). When individuals face notable
cognitive demands and are capacity limited, they tend to resort
to the cognitively less demanding associative mode of
processing. When individuals face novel situations, they are
likely to use the rule-based processing mode with its greater
flexibility and capacity for using counterfactual thinking
(Smith and DeCoster 2000). 
The relationship between existing knowledge structures and
mental models has been a source of a number of conceptual
differences in the literature dealing with mental models
(Brewer 1987). As a simplification, the different perspectives
may be placed on a continuum, with one end reflecting the
perspective that mental models are pre-existing and relatively
stable knowledge structures (Abel et al. 1998, Nersessian
2002), and the other end reflecting the perspective that mental
models are relatively ephemeral knowledge structures created
(from more stable knowledge structures) in relation to a
specific situation (Brewer 1987). We position our
conceptualization of mental models on the ephemeral end of
the continuum: mental models are compiled as and when
needed from pre-existing knowledge structures that are cued
by the expectation of a situation (expectation frame) and the
actual situation (Fig. 1). This positioning is consistent with
recent literature on situated cognition (Smith and Semin 2004,
2007), on grounded or embodied cognition (Yeh and Barsalou
2006, Barsalou 2008, 2009), and on dual-process models in
social cognition (Smith and DeCoster 2000, Kahneman
2011). 
It might be argued that elements of what we have placed in
the knowledge structures box of Fig. 1 could be called mental
models. Following Smith and Semin (2004) and Barsalou
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(2008), we assert that a vital purpose of cognition is to support
action in a given situation. The concept of mental models is a
sense-making device that helps us think about and
communicate processes of cognition and also helps us think
through how to observe or measure peoples’ conceptions of
situations so that we might understand their responses. Thus,
in the conceptualization we present here, a mental model only
comes into being in relation to a specific situation for which
it is required to support action. Mental models support action;
associative and rule-based knowledge structures make up the
basic knowledge elements that are drawn upon to compile the
mental models. 
Recent thinking on dual-process models in social cognition
has important implications for how mental models are
conceived and also for how they are elicited and measured. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature;
however, for the interested reader, the recent books by
Kahneman (2011) and Stanovich (1999) as well as the review
by Smith and DeCoster (2000) are useful overviews of existing
theory and experimental work. Here, we draw heavily on the
model presented by Smith and DeCoster (2000). We draw on
the gross patterns of relationships reflected by these authors
and do not explore the many subtleties and nuances of their
model. 
Dual-process theories propose that people use two cognitive
processing systems: one is conceived as being a rapid and low-
cognitive effort processing system often associated with
automaticity, intuition, or common sense. The second
processing system is conceived as being slower, requiring
greater cognitive effort, and is associated with procedural or
rule-based thinking (Novak and Hoffman 2009). In their
model, Smith and DeCoster (2000) portray the rapid or
associative processing system as reflecting stable,
experientially based knowledge that is organized as networks
of associations. The slower, more effortful, rule-based
processing system is organized around formal or informal
rules, which may be less stable than the experientially based
associations of the associative knowledge system. Access to
the information or knowledge in this rule-based system
requires more controlled search and retrieval of rules and
information. The two modes of processing are closely linked.
Repeated use of particular relationships from the rule-based
system may lead to these relationships becoming part of the
more stable associative knowledge system; the relationships
cued from the associative processing system may initially
weight the rules to be used in rule-based processing. An
unresolved issue in this body of theory is the degree to which
these two processing systems operate simultaneously or
sequentially. Smith and DeCoster (2000) argue that people use
the two systems simultaneously. 
Individuals have been found to reflect quite different cognitive
styles (Stanovich 1999), have different requirements for
cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982, Webster and Kruglanski
1994), and may be more visually or verbally oriented (Childers
et al. 1985). These different cognitive dispositions are
correlated with cognitive performance (Stanovich 1999) and
may orient individuals more to using associative or rule-based
modes of thinking. 
Having briefly outlined this conceptualization of mental
models, we now use the conceptualization to discuss the
findings from the papers in the special feature. We pay
particular attention to the contributions that each of these
factors might make to elicited mental models.
EXAMINING THE ELICITATION PROCESSES:
ARDI AND CONSENSUS ANALYSIS
We orient our comparisons of the results of mental model
elicitation using ARDI and consensus analysis around the
elements of the conceptual model of mental models (Fig. 1).
We examine how each of the two methods enabled or
constrained analysis of each of the components of mental
models depicted in Fig. 1, with the exception that we do not
explicitly discuss the expectation frame component of the
model because we have no information on this component
other than to note that there was likely to be a good deal of
variation in the expectation frames of respondents. Different
respondents were identified and asked to take part in the
studies through direct contacts made by members of the South
African team. These requests were framed to persuade the
potential respondent to participate, and were less concerned
with establishing a common expectation frame across
respondents.
Situations
A range of studies have found that situational variables have
a significant effect on the outcomes of individual behavior
(Barker 1968, Baumeister and Tice 1985, Mesquita et al.
2010). Situational variables include those related to the
physical setting, e.g., features of the physical setting, including
space and time and the extent to which the setting is public or
not, as well as characteristics of the subject such as their
physical attributes, prior experience, and the cognitive and
affective dynamics of the situation, e.g., the subject’s
information about the situation and its relevance to the
subject’s goals. The background knowledge of the individual
such as his/her knowledge of other people, and what
Baumeister and Tice (1985) call the “matrix of possibilities”
relate to factors such as the range of options and freedom to
choose among options available to the individual. Altogether,
Baumeister and Tice (1985) identify 51 situation attributes
that, across the studies they reviewed, had been found to
influence individual behavior. 
The studies presented as part of this special feature did not
control for the effects of situational variables. We therefore
do not have direct measures of the effects of situational
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variables on the elicited mental models. What follows is our
subjective and qualitative analysis of the likely impacts of
different situational variables on the resulting data. 
An important situational difference between the research
carried out in the Camargue (Mathevet et al. 2011) and that
carried out in the Crocodile River catchment (Etienne et al.
2011, Stone-Jovicich et al. 2011) is the nature of the
interactions between researchers and subjects. In the
Camargue, the research was part of a sustained process of
interaction between researchers and subjects; in the Crocodile
River catchment, research interactions with subjects
comprised single interaction events. In situations
characterized by single-visit research processes, we suggest
that individuals would be less motivated to engage in effortful
thought, making responses based on associative knowledge
systems more likely. In contrast, sustained relationships and
interactions between researchers and practitioners on issues
that the practitioners cared about would provide strong
motivation for the subjects to carefully consider their
responses. Hence, the mental models that were expressed in
the Camargue were likely to draw strongly on rule-based
knowledge structures. All else being equal, when people care
strongly about a subject, they will be motivated toward
accuracy in their understanding of the subject; the desire for
accuracy is often associated with rule-based knowledge
structures and processing (Chaiken and Stangor 1987, Chaiken
et al. 1996, Smith and DeCoster 2000). 
This observation also relates to the way the research was
framed in each situation. In the Crocodile River catchment,
where the ARDI approach was used, the research process was
framed to respondents as a question about their thoughts
around water resource use and management in the catchment
(Etienne et al. 2011). In contrast, in the second stage of the
consensus analysis approach, respondents were asked to select
either yes or no responses to lists of stakeholders or causes of
problems, as well as to sort concepts about consequences and
future priorities (Stone-Jovicich et al. 2011). These different
framings, i.e., the ARDI approach that focused on thinking,
and the consensus analysis approach that focused on
associations among concepts and questions, may well have
cued rule-based and associative knowledge structures,
respectively. We suggest that the consensus analysis approach
as applied in South Africa does not so much elicit mental
models as the more fundamental knowledge structures of Fig.
1. The application in France, while not true to the formal
cultural consensus model, does illustrate the application of the
informal consensus analysis model and provides a measure of
consensus in the mental models of participants, mental models
that we have suggested draw heavily on rule-based knowledge
structures. 
In addition, half of the Camargue respondents had been
interacting with each other in relation to water management
in the Rhone Delta, in both formal and informal settings over
a number of years. Theirs was a history of repeated interactions
in relation to the common environmental domain. There was
likely considerable “elaboration, communication and
dissemination of knowledge systems” (Wagner and Hayes
2005:322). This would lead us to predict a relatively high
transfer level of rule-based knowledge into the associative or
experiential knowledge systems of the longer-term water
board members, with greater consensus and stability in their
associative knowledge. Although we cannot differentiate
between associative and rule-based knowledge structures in
the mental models elicited from Camargue respondents, there
was greater consensus among long-term water board members
relative to newcomers and outsiders (Mathevet et al. 2011). 
This sort of sustained relationship with a common
management problem was not the situation in the Crocodile
River catchment in South Africa. That situation reflected a
more fragmented set of interactions, with only a few of the
interviewed irrigators or conservationists interacting
frequently through formal or informal settings. In addition,
when they occurred, these interactions were likely to focus on
a number of different problem domains, and not specifically
on the Crocodile River catchment. 
Implementation of the ARDI process in the French case
involved individual interviews, either at the respondents’
home or place of work (Mathevet et al. 2011). In South Africa,
the respondents selected for the ARDI approach were
interviewed in one of two formal meeting room locations.
Respondents selected for the consensus analysis interview
process (stage two) were either interviewed in national park
offices, their place of work, or their home. In some cases, these
respondents were highly time constrained, whereas in other
cases, there were significant situational cues available to them.
We therefore have no explicit measures of the effects of these
different situational variables on the elicited mental models in
either the South African or French cases. More recent, but as
yet unpublished, research by one of the authors clearly
demonstrates situational effects on elicited mental models
(Jones 2012).
Knowledge structures
The two data collection instruments used as part of the
consensus analysis’ second stage in the Crocodile River
catchment did not lend themselves, and were not designed, to
elicit rule-based knowledge structures. The yes/no and pile-
sort instruments were more likely to elicit fundamental
knowledge structures rather than mental models as we have
defined them (Fig. 1) because this is what the cultural
consensus technique is designed to measure (Weller 2007). In
contrast, the ARDI process is designed to provide a framework
for respondents to think through and describe the state
(including the dynamic state) of a given social-ecological
system (Etienne et al. 2011). The ARDI process is therefore
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likely to result in mental models that draw heavily on rule-
based knowledge structures. 
The application of the ARDI process in the Camargue provided
an interesting hybrid from an analytical perspective but not
from an elicitation perspective: elicitation was oriented toward
rule-based knowledge structures using the ARDI process,
whereas analysis was oriented toward understanding the
degree to which elements of the elicited mental models were
shared among the subjects.
Motivations and capacities
Measures of the motivations or capacities of individuals
responding to each of the tasks were not made in any of the
cases. We suspect that different groups may have had different
motivations to engage with the research. The work in the
Camargue, for example, as part of an ongoing research
activity, was likely to provide strong incentives for individuals
to engage with the research process. This was less true in the
South African situation, where interactions between
researchers and respondents were framed as a single research
or data collection event. Some respondents were observed to
be highly time constrained in the consensus analysis
component of the South African research, which could result
in their relying more on associative rather than rule-based
knowledge structures. For many respondents in the South
African case, there appeared to be a political motivation to
engage with the research. As Du Toit et al. (2011) noted, the
research was conducted during a period of time in which the
organizations and structures associated with implementing the
water act were being developed and bedded down. It was thus
likely that several of the respondents saw this research project
as a means to achieve political ends. We suggest that in these
situations, respondents were likely to be more reliant on rule-
based than associative knowledge structures. 
As far as we were able to observe in the South African situation
and in the Camargue, individual respondents could focus
almost exclusively on the task at hand. It was unlikely therefore
that respondents faced situations of high demands on their
cognitive capacity; hence, the observation that associative
knowledge structures are often used in situations of high
cognitive load was not likely to apply (Smith and DeCoster
2000). However, some respondents taking part in the ARDI
process, both in South Africa and France, noted that the task
was highly taxing. Where respondents were taxed in this way,
our model predicts they would be motivated to rely more on
associative than rule-based knowledge structures.
Mental models
To elicit mental models effectively in relation to a given
purpose, it should be clear from the preceding discussion that
an elicitation process needs to be designed in relation to what
is being sought: fundamental knowledge structures, deeply
thought mental models, or spur of the moment mental models
(Fig. 1). In regard to the work carried out in South Africa and
France, we were only partially aware of these different
components of mental models. As a consequence, we either
did not take measurements that enabled us to identify the
contributions of these different components or we were
unsuccessful in holding elements such as situations constant.
One of the objectives of this special feature and synthesis paper
is to provide a synthesis of the literature and our experiences
to support a greater awareness among future researchers of
these different components of mental models and hence their
influence as sources of variability in elicited mental models
across time or groups. 
Our conceptualization of mental models suggests that we
would find greater stability and consensus in the associative
knowledge elements of mental models because these are the
commonly held (consensual) and experientially based
knowledge components. Data from the Camargue (Mathevet
et al. 2011) provide some evidence to support this prediction.
Owing to the necessity of frequent interaction and hence
experience among important stakeholder groups, we expect
that the knowledge of stakeholders would be relatively stable
and consensual. Among the Camargue respondents, there was
strong agreement among most respondents as to who the key
stakeholders in the system were (Mathevet et al. 2011). In
contrast, and as might be predicted from our conceptual model
and the conceptualization of Smith and DeCoster (2000), more
complex phenomena are unlikely to be directly experienced;
mental models of these phenomena are thus likely to draw on
rule-based knowledge structures to a greater extent and hence
be more individually variable and unstable. Consistent with
this expectation was the lack of consensus in the mental models
of interactions among actors, resources, and dynamics in the
mental models of respondents in the Camargue (Mathevet et
al. 2011). 
Overall, the consensus analysis approach to eliciting mental
models used in the South African case was well oriented to
measure what it was designed to measure: shared associative
or rule-based knowledge structures. In contrast, the ARDI
approach used in South Africa was well suited to eliciting
elements of rule-based knowledge structures. Although the
ARDI approach that combines development of the
diagrammatic representation with discussion of the meanings
and associations provides a rich narrative associated with the
mental models, no simple way of analyzing these has yet been
implemented. 
Our conceptual model and the results from the papers in this
special feature pose some significant challenges in relation to
eliciting mental models associated with human-environment
interactions. One of the most notable of these challenges is the
potential influence of the situation on the elicited mental
model. Social psychology theorists argue convincingly that
people generate situated mental models that are oriented
toward situated action (Smith and Semin 2004, Barsalou
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2009). To understand the mental models of individuals or
groups in a research situation, we need to understand how they
construed or framed the research situation. It is an open
question as to how similar the mental models derived in a
research situation would be to those used in a different action
situation such as planning or taking a vote on a set of actions.
Differences in what people say they will do versus what they
actually do have been well documented (Argyris and Schön
1978). In eliciting mental models, we therefore need to be
cognizant that what has been elicited may not at all reflect the
mental models that would be used in the actual action
situations in which we were interested.
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of a mental model is used across a diverse
spectrum of academic disciplines. Across this spectrum, the
concept may have quite different meanings. In part, because
mental models are unobservable, there is no objective reality
to provide feedbacks that might iterate thinking and
communication toward a more accurate representation of a
mental model. Mental models therefore become what our
specific academic cultures have come to think of them as
through the processes of “elaboration, communication and
dissemination” (Wagner and Hayes 2005:322). There is no
one true conception of a mental model, and some researchers
question the existence of mental models altogether (Barsalou
2003, Barsalou et al. 2003). Why then have we gone to all the
trouble of developing a conceptual model of mental models
and of exploring processes for the measurement of mental
models? Because the concept of a mental model is useful: it
provides a sense-making device that we can use to think and
communicate about how people think and communicate about
human-environment interactions. To distort Box’s oft-quoted
dictum: our mental models of mental models are wrong, but
some of them, in some instances, may be useful. In presenting
the conceptualization (Fig. 1) and using it to examine the
papers in this special feature, we have sought to increase the
utility of the mental models concept in the realm of human-
environment interactions. The conceptualization of Fig. 1
builds on key bodies of social psychology and cognitive
science theory that we hope will be both a useful (albeit highly
simplified) synthesis of some relevant parts of this literature
as well as increasing the utility of the mental models concept
for future thought and communication. 
From reflection upon the South African and Camargue
research and from the perspective of the conceptual model
(Fig. 1), we have identified a number of important lessons and
a number of challenges. 
One important lesson relates to the interconnections between
situations, respondents, and elicited mental models. Elicited
mental models can only really be understood as part of a
situation. To understand the mental model, we need to know
about the situation: They are inseparable and should not be
treated otherwise. Related to this need for situational
knowledge is the recognition of the need to know about the
individual, his/her cognitive orientations, and his/her
cognitive capacity constraints as they relate to the situation. 
A second important lesson relates to clarifying what it is we
seek to elicit and why. We need to be clear on whether we
want to know about associative or rule-based knowledge
structures or if we want to know about the combinations of
these that are the basis of elicited mental models. Depending
on what we are after, we can then use elicitation techniques
that will capture the desired information. We need to recognize
that if we seek to identify more stable and consensual elements
of mental models, then our data collection should focus more
on capturing associative knowledge structures. Based on our
experiences with eliciting mental models using a consensus
analysis approach and the ARDI approach, we think that mixed
methods approaches that capture both associative and rule-
based knowledge structures are likely to be the most
informative when investigating mental models of human-
environment interactions. 
There are many unanswered questions and important
challenges that need to be addressed to improve our collective
ability to elicit and analyze mental models in the context of
human-environment interactions. First, we know little about
the relationships between elicited mental models and actions
in a given action situation. It is difficult to imagine simple,
field-based processes to explore these relationships.
Investigations of this sort may be able to build on the extensive
knowledge base developed around attitude-behavior
relationships (Ajzen 2001, Ajzen and Fishbein 2005, Crano
and Prislin 2006). However, unraveling the complex
relationships associated with mental models as we construe
them is likely to require significant research investment and
may be most easily addressed in laboratory experimental
settings in the preliminary stages, taking into account our
previous comments in relation to mental models and action
situations. It may be fruitful to explore narrative-based
approaches that analyze an individual’s narrative of his/her
experiences, including his/her descriptions of the situations in
which these experiences occurred. 
A second challenge comprises the development and
implementation of simple measurement instruments to
identify the effects on the elicited mental models of respondent
motivation, capacity, and orientation. Although a number of
these measures exist, their length makes it difficult to envisage
their use in association with a mental model elicitation activity
(Lohman and Bosma 2002, Mayer et al. 2007). Field-based
research will be challenged to develop meaningful measures
of these factors that are implementable without overwhelming
the focus of the study. 
We have paid scant attention to the effects of group processes
on elicited mental models. The results of the research in the
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Camargue (Mathevet et al. 2011) indicate that group
interactions lead to more consensual mental models. This
finding is consistent with research in other fields (Mohammed
et al. 2010). There is considerable literature on group processes
and how these affect group outcomes (Hogg and Tindale
2003). Group situations such as those reflected in the papers
of this special issue are fundamentally different to situations
involving individuals. Although the conceptual model we
present (Fig. 1) might be useful as a preliminary guide for
research in these contexts, the additional complexities
associated with group processes and dynamics would make
the situation much more difficult to work with. In applied
contexts, the safe strategy is likely to be to create as closely
as possible the actual situation in which mental models are to
be used and to seek to elicit mental models in those situations.
If decisions are to be made through group processes and a
mental models approach is used to understand these decisions,
then elicitation processes designed to work with group
situations would be needed. The ARDI process was designed
as a group elicitation process (Étienne 2006) and could prove
useful in group processes; however, the ARDI data-collection
process is unlikely to be akin to the actual decision processes
for any real world decision making. 
The widespread use of the concept of mental models suggests
that scholars and practitioners alike are aware of the need to
take the cognitive dimensions of people and social systems
into consideration when investigating or managing social-
ecological systems. Culture, or “the set of learned and shared
beliefs and behaviors...of a group” (Weller 2007), is a vitally
important component of the structure of social systems that
therefore contributes both to enabling and constraining social
change (Archer 1995). We hope that through the papers of this
special feature and through this synthesis paper we have
contributed to a more informed understanding of key elements
of the theory associated with mental models as well as some
tools for working with mental models and their associated
knowledge structures.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art23/
responses/
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